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In this paper I will discuss one element of the structural conditions or 
organisational properties underlying "neo-corporatism": i.e. the organisation 
of trade unions. In particular, I am concerned with the position of central 
peak associations or national confederations within the national trade union 
movements. (1)
Why national union confederations? Trade union confederations are the 
"most comprehensive element" in a nation's trade union structure (Windmuller, 
1975). They tend to behave as what Mancur Olson has called "encompassing 
organisations" (Olson, 1976, 1982). This can be seen as a function of both 
their relative size and the likely heterogeneity of their composite 
membership. Like large unions, confederations cannot easily disregard the 
externalities of their behaviour, nor can they hope to get away with "free­
riding" behaviour as a small union organisation in a decentralised system with 
many dispersed actors and little mutual trust can. Unlike such small actors 
they cannot expect to benefit from the "important advantage of being 
unimportant" (A. Marshall). Consequently, union size may be expected to have 
a positive effect with respect to, if not the union's willingness to adhere 
to, for example, wage restraint and incomes policies, at least the observance 
of such policies (von Weiszacker 1978, Tarantelli 1984). Heterogeneity, which 
normally should increase with size, adds to this effect. Hetergenous unions 
and union confederations, comprising memberships with different positions and 
statuses in the economy and labour market, tend to be more broadly aggregative 
in their demands. One group's gains may be another group's losses. Hence, if 
they want to avoid their own organisational disintegration, they are bound to 



























































































"collective goods" that can benefit all, or most, at the same time. According
to Olson, economic growth is the most typical of such goods:
"We should expect that organisations representing relatively 
specialized, narrow, or local interests, would tend to be less 
inhibited about growth-repressing policies than broader 
organisations. The highly specialized craft union, for example, 
will find that, though its featherbedding will have the 'external 
diseconomy' of reduced national output and will even typically 
reduce the aggregate earnings of the factors of production in the 
industry in which its members are employed, its own members bear 
such a minute cost that the featherbedding may still be 
attractive. An organisation that represents all of the workers, 
or all of the firms, in an industry, will have reasons to be 
somewhat less restrictive". (Olson 1976, 34)
This would apply to national confederations even more:
"A union that represented all manual workers in a country, or an 
organisation that represented all major businesses, or a 
political party that represented all of some broad social group, 
such as the 'working class', would 'internalize' so much of the 
'external diseconomy' of a growth reducing policy that it is 
likely to do almost as much to promote economic growth as to 
prevent it". (Ibid.)
Philippe Schmitter has pointed at the same possibility of national peak 
associations, that is, to offset the normal properties of interest-group 
action, its tendency being to specialize in the furtherance of one rather 
limited interest. A national union confederation especially when internally 
structured by industrial unions and closely linked to a large class-based 
party,
"...may internalize a considerable range of interests, e.g., 
workers, consumers, taxpayers, pensioners, etc., and hence be 
expected to weigh up and moderate claims within its 
organizational structure rather than pass them on to external 
political processes". (Schmitter 1981, 15)
Trade union confederations are associations of associations. Normally, 
they have no direct individual members as unions do, but their members consist 
of union organisations. May they, given size and heterogeneity, be inclined 
to "take a somewhat less parochial view than the narrow associations of which 



























































































unity and authority vis-à-vis these member-associations to arrive at coherent
policies. So, we should treat the internal unity and the authority over 
affiliates, respectively the ability to take binding decision on their behalf, 
as important variables.
The possibility of a national union confederation to coordinate and 
control its affiliates will also be affected by the number of affiliates and 
the equality of these affiliates in terms of size and resources. If the 
number of affiliated unions is small, the confederation's control capacity 
tends to be high, simply because many are more difficult to control than few. 
However, the smaller the number of affiliates, the larger each of them will 
be, and the larger an affiliate the more power and resources it will have. In 
other words, it is likely to be less dependent on the confederation. One 
would expect that the control capacity of a confederation would be impaired 
most when some of its affiliates are large and the remainder numerous, small 
and dependent.
Frequently, a nation's union movement is represented by more than one 
peak association of trade unions. Their division may have different reasons 
and consequences (see: infra). Other things being equal, the reasoning 
followed above may be expected to apply better to a united national 
confederation, comprising all possible sections of the working class, than to 
a divided group of confederations, better to non-competing than to competing 
confederations, more to confederatoins that are largely representative than to 
confederations which are threatened by old or new outside competitors.
Most of the variables specified so far will be recalled from Schmitter's 
original definition of a corporatist system of interest-intermediation: 
singularity, representational monopoly, non-competitive, hierarchically 
ordered, functionally differentiated, compulsory, state recognized or licensed 




























































































set of observable, institutionally distinctive traits of interest 
representation. In this definition, two dimensions are combined: recognition 
and control by governments on the one hand, and the structure of the system of 
interest intermediation on the other. As Lehmbruch has noticed, the emphasis ^
(
is on the latter (Lehmbruch 1982, 5). Indeed, the definition suggest a co­
variation of the dimensions "organisational participation in government" and 
"structure of the system of interest intermediation". There are good
theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the co-optation of 
organisations into government bodies enhances the tendency towards 
representational monopoly and hierarchical structure, but one could conceive 
of a reverse relationship as easily. The same might be argued for the co­
variation with yet another dimension of "corporatism". Often corporatism is 
referred to as "concertation", i.e. arrangements, deals or exchanges in which 
the participating associations become co-responsible for policy-formation and 
capable of exercising control over the behaviour of members (Lehmbruch 1982,
Crouch 1982, Schmitter 1983). Usually, the argument has been that
"concertation" presupposed a highly structured system of interest 
intermediation, but some evidence suggests an incremetalist relationship the 
other way round.
It seems appropriate to consider these as empirical questions and to 
measure the dimensions involved independently. This implies the construction 
of theoretically informed and valid indicators as well as establishing the
r
appropriate data base. Lehmbruch has rightly pointed to the fact that in the 
field of interest intermediation, we are in a much less privileged position 
compared to electoral and party research, in which a rich data base of 
official electoral statistics and survey research exists. As interest 
intermediation is often weakly and less uniformly institutionalized, the 




























































































and fragmentary. Frequently, the information given is outdated and measured 
at only one point in time, and, across countries, not even the same point in 
time (e.g. Von Beyme 1977). Considering the important changes in 
organizational structures and practices in, for instance, a number of British 
and German unions, which took place in the relatively short period of fifteen 
years (Undy et al. 1981, Streeck 1982), this "static" treatment of data is
even inappropriate with respect to the most "systematic" and "hard-to-change" 
dimension of corporatism: the organisational structure of the system of
interest intermediation.
The first purpose of this paper is to develop a set of multi-dimensional 
indicators measuring the position and strength of national confederations of 
trade unions within the wider trade union movement. In doing so, I will 
disentangle the different dimensions involved in what is usually called the 
"centralisation" of the trade union movement. My basic idea is that we should 
distinguish between three sets of organisational properties:
the first relates to the horizontal integration of the national trade 
union movement: singularity, monopoly, unity and non-competitiveness;
the second dimension relates to the vertical or hierarchical 
integration of the national trade union movement, i.e. centralisation of 
decision-making proper;
- finally, I want to distinguish a third dimension, related to both 
horizontal and vertical integration, i.e. organisational concentration.
Each of these dimensions or sets of organisational properties can be 
measured through multiple indicators. However, only some aspects can be 




























































































e.g., associational monopoly, union density, number of unions, equality of 
affiliates. For some aspects, such as staff-member ratio, strike payment, 
etc., data are harder to acquire, less precise and of a more 'static' 
character. In order to arrive at theoretically meaningful, composite indexes, 
we are bound to evaluate and to weigh differences. The commensurability of, 
indeed, complex configurations may depend upon employing rather weak levels of 
measurement (Headey 1970, Lehmbruch 1982).
In the following I will discuss twenty national confederations of trade 
unions in ten West European countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and West Germany. 
All these confederations are peak associations, that is, they have other 
associations, i.e trade unions, as their members. Secondly, they are national 
organisations, in principle covering the whole national territory. Thirdly, 
they organize throughout the national economy, comprising several sectors of 
industrial and economic, privately or publicly organized activity. (2) In 
1980 the twenty confederations discussed in this paper had a combined 
membership of about 38 million persons or 87.4% of all unionized workers in 
the ten countries considered.
The data have been gathered through national and international 
statistical sources, union statistics, union rulebooks and other union 
sources, monographs on trade unions and trade union movements and some 
additional interviews. The sources have been documented in "Dimensions of 
Union Growth in Western Europe" (Visser 1984), to which a bibliography of 
national and international sources used has been added.
In its present state, this paper aims first of all at the construction of 
a set of indicators and the presentation of a comparative data-set. In a 
later stage, data and indicators will be more clearly applied to theory and 




























































































deals with the position of national confederations of trade unions, that is, 
one focal organisation in the wider organisational action set of which each 
national trade union movement is composed, finally, the indices proposed do 
not "measure" societal corporatism - as has been suggested in some of the 
older literature (cf. Wilensky 1976, Schmitter 1982) - but only one element 
underlying corporatism. One would also need to consider the other side, that 
























































































































































































V i l i
FOOTNOTES
(1) The empirical research on which this paper is based has been conducted 
during my stay at the European Univeristy Institute in Florence and is 
closely related to the international comparative project on Business 
Interest Organizations, directed by Philippe C. Schmitter anb Wolfgang 
Streeck. An earlier draft has been presented at the Fifth Summer School 
on Comparative Politics (Florence, 20 June - 16 July, 1983). I have 
benefitted from the many comments of its participants. In particular, I 
wish to express my gratitude to Colin Crouch, Peter Farago, G(6sta Esping- 
Andersen, Walter Jansen Heytmeijer, Suzanne Lindholm, Marino Regini, Bill 
Roche, Michele Micheletti, Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter. Of 
course, the final product is, for better or for worse, my sole 
responsibility.
(2) These are all organisations of which unions are members. Not included 
are "bargaining cartells", etc., which frequently exist between unions, 
affiliated to the same or to different confederations, within the same 
sector fo the economy: e.g., the Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Unions and similar bargaining coalitions in other sectors, 
such as textiles, in the United Kingdom, the Federativ-Verbandes des 
Personals oeffentliche Verwaltungen und Betriebe in Switzerland, the 
Algemene Centrale van Overheidspersoneel and similar Christian union 
coalitions in the public sector in the Netherlands, the "bargaining 























































































































































































I. ASSOCIATIOHAL MONOPOLY and UNITY
This dimension has four aspects that need to be considered: (a)
unity (b) internal fragmentation, (c) associations! monopoly, and 
(d) external competition.
(a) Unity
In some countries only one central peak association exists or 
predominates, whereas in other countries two or more such national 
centres exist. If "pluralism" of national union centres prevails, 
we are interested in the types of relationships between them: do
they compete for membership and or influence, are they politically, 
ideologically and/or organisationally adverse to each other, do they 
ignore each other (recruiting and representing members in different 
areas of the economy), or do they cooperate? These are some of the 
possibilities that presumably depend to a large extent on the type 
of cleavage which determines the division of a national trade union 
movement predominantly arises. An important consideration is to 
what extent the domains of membership of these organisations 
overlap. One would expect that the more confederations (that is to 
say: their affiliated unions) recruit members among the same
categories of wage earners (defined by sector of the economy, 
skill-level, status, regional, cultural, ethnical, linguistic 
criteria etc.), the more likely competition between these 
confederations will be high. In this sense, it makes a difference




























































































occupational status, or whether it is of a more diffuse nature, for 
example arising from different political views and allignments. 
Competition for membership is likely to be related to competition 
for influence vis-à-vis employers and the state, although one can 
have competition for influence without competition for members.
The division of a national trade union movement may arise from 
several sources:
— Religious cleavages have often lead the basis for the creation of 
seperate national union confederations, each of which identifies 
itself with a particular and distinct set of beliefs. This division 
is predominant (but weakened) in the Netherlands, and explains a 
part of the divisions found in Switzerland. Before 1933 and 1934 
respectively, this was the main dividing line in the German and 
Austrian trade union movement.
— Different political and ideological views and affiliations are the 
second main source from which a divided trade union movement arises, 
as in the cases of Italy and France.
In most cases these two divisions somehow go together. The 
political division in the French trade union movement has also 
religious components, at least up to 1964 (formation of the 
CFDT). In Italy it undoubtedly has strong religious origins. 
Of course the reverse is also true, religious divisions often 
go together with different political views and allignments, not 
surprisingly, since the party system in Western Europe is to a 
large extent based on the same cleavage. Nevertheless, I still 
think it meaningful to distinguish between these two types of 
division within a nation trade union movement, since they are 
related to quite different inter-organisational consequences. 




























































































which each confederation captures a part of the workforce that 
is distinct by religious identity and, thei'efore, relatively 
closed as area of recruitment for competing confederations, may 
find it easier to cooperate at the level of confederations, of 
which each is granted its own domain and internal autonomy, 
than a movement which is split politically. An example of this 
is provided by the three Dutch confederations (catholic, 
protestant and social-democratic), that - aft r the immediate 
post-war challenge of a "Doorbraak" or de-pillarization had 
proven to be ephemerical - found it quite easy to agree and, 
what is more, to implement a "non-competition pact", as they 
found it equally easy to cooperate with one another on 
virtually all policy matters but one: the educational 
activities that were supposed to foster the own identity. 
Headey, in his 1970-article on trade union centralisation makes 
more or less the same point. Although he does not directly 
deal with unity of the trade union movement, he rightly 
observes that inter-confederal cooperation is most difficult to 
obtain when the split is political. In this form, however, his 
statement comes near of being tautological. Thus, Headey 
limits "political divided" to those cases where one of the 
major union centres is communist, which he then assumes to be 
equal o "competitive militancy". From this it follows that 
"where a communist confederation exists (...) it seems 
unlikely that a wage policy would be accepted" or any form of 
cooperation between confederations be viable. Though we should 
not exclude other types of political divisions (e.g , between 
liberal, centrist or social-democratic oriented 
confederations), neither assume "competitive militancy" 1 o be 
an exclusive property of communist trade union centres, it does 
seem to me a reasonable proposition that inter-confederal 
coopertion is likely to be of a more strained nature when the 
split is mainly political. The reason being that a political 
division by its very nature entails a rather geneneralized and 
diffuse competitiveness. (e.g., the perpetious difficulties in 
maintaining a "Federazione unitaria" between the three Italian 
confederations, and the rather short-lived and partial 
cooperation between the CGT and the CFDT in France).
— A third type of division is associated with conflicting 
organisational principles: organisation of unions according to 
craft/skill-level/occupation/status versus organisation according to 
industrial sector. Historically, this issue has played a major role 
in almost all countries. The last major example of this loading to 
two seperated confederations could be found in the United States 
before the merger of the AFL (craft based) and the CIO (industrial 




























































































especially since World War II, this source of conflict - known as 
the classical Organisationsfrage - has lost much of its troubling 
character, although it still plays an important role within many 
confederations. I return to this point shortly, that is in relation 
with the internal fragmentation of trade union confederations. The 
only actual but, indeed, minor example of a separate craft-based 
confederation is the YS in Norway, founded in 1977 and comprising 
both manual and non-manual craft unions (if we neglect the even 
smaller "federations" of craft unions still existing in some older 
industries, particularly textiles, in the U.K.).
— More important has become a fourth source of division, which can 
be seen as a modified version of the third type: the division based 
on status and occupational differences, particularly between manual 
and non-manual occupations. This difference accounts for the 
existence of independent confederations of white collar employees, 
managerial staffs and civil servants in Sweden (TCO, SACO-SR), 
Denmark (FTF, AC), Norway (AF, YS), West Germany (DAG, DBB, ULA), 
Netherlands (RMHP), Switzerland (VSA) and France (CGC-CFE, FEN). 
Almost everywhere these confederations, some of them may be better 
described as a loose federation of white collar unions, came into 
existence in response to the existing "general" confederation which 
organized indistinctively blue and white collar workers. In general 
they are of a much younger age. With the exception of the Austrian 
and German confederations OGB and DGB that were founded after the 
last world war (but in fact they were reconstitutions of much older 
confederations) and a number of confederations that came into 




























































































CISL and the UIL, in France the FO and the CFDT), all the manual 
workers and general confederations date back to the turn of the 
century, and some even long before that. The oldest are the Britsh 
TUC (1868) and the Swiss SGB (1880), followed by the French COT 
(1895) and the three Scandinavian LO’s (just before the turn of the 
century), with the Dutch NVV (1905) and the Italian CGIL (1906) 
closing the queue. The protestant and catholic confederations were 
all formed between 1900 and the end of World War I. The white 
collar union confederations, with the exception of the Swiss VSA 
which was founded iv 1920, are more recent inventions: TOO and SACO 
(Sweden, 1944 and 1947, respectively); CGC (France, 1945); DAG, 
DBB, ULA (West Germany, 1945, 1950 and 1951 respectively, but here 
again there had been forerunners), FTF (Denmark, 1952) and a 
proliferation of smaller white collar confederations (or union 
coalitions) since the 1970s.
The occupational division is likely to be associated with lower 
levels of inter-confederal conflict in so far as each one is 
specializing in recruiting one category of employees: for example, 
in Sweden between the L0 and the TC0; in Denmark between the L0, 
the FTF and the AC; or in Switzerland between the SGB and the VSA. 
But the typical situation is that we have on the one hand a general 
confederation organizing all employees, manual as well as 
non-manual, and on the other hand a smaller confederation which 
specializes in organizing only the latter category of employees, 
which means that the two organisations compete in this domain of 
white collar occupations.




























































































related to regional (cultural, ethnical, linguistical) differences. 
Among the countries considered, only in Switzerland this accounts 
for a seperate confederation, the Fédération Romande des Employés 
(Canada and Belgium present major cases of this division). (2)
— Had we included countries like Canada and Ireland in our 
comparision, yet another dividing line in the trade union movement 
would be discovered: between unions affiliated to national and 
unions affiliated to international confederations that have their 
headquarters abroad. In Canada, unions affiliated to confederations 
with headquarters in the USA represented still 49% of the total 
union membership in 1976. In the Irish Republic, unions affiliated 
to British confederations accounted for 15% of the total membership 
in 1979.
Table 1 visualizes the presence of divisions in the national trade 
union movements. I have omitted the two dimensions 





























































































Table 1: divisions between central peak federations of trade unions
political religious occupational regional
Austria 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom 0 0 (1) 0
West Germany 0 O' 1 0
Norway 0 0 1 0
Sweden 0 0 2 0
Denmark 0 0 2 0
Italy 2 0 0 0
Netherlands (1) 2 1 0
Switzerland 1 1 1 1
France 2 1 1 0
1 = minor
2 = major
() = emerging or, to some extent, present
I will briefly discuss each country:
Austria is the only case in which - since 1945 - only one central 
peak organisation exists: the Oesterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund. 
The OGB has established a singular position: although in majority 
socialist, it transcends all political and religious divisions 
existing in Austria. OGB-membership equals total union membership 
in Austria.
United Kingdom: the Trade Union Congress is in fact the only 
central peak federation of trade unions organizing wage and salary 
earners throughout all sectors of the economy. Despite being 
closely tied to the Labour Party, many originally independent unions 
of white collar employees and civil servants have joined the TUC 
during the past two decades. The TUC is not the only confederation, 
though. Next to the TUC the Department of Employment lists some 43 
"confederations" operating in the U.K. Some are more readily 




























































































adopted a federal structure. Some are just joint bodies or 
bargaining coalitions of either craft unions in particular sectors 
of the economy (e.g. textile, printing & papermaking) or 
professional employee unions (March 1979, ACAS 1981). Although many 
unions have still remained outside the TUC, they are generally the 
very small ones:
Table 2: number and average size of unions in U.K. , 1950-1979.












1950 186 42.085 546 2.676 84.3%
1960 183 43.958 481 3.338 83.7%
1970 142 70.438 401 2.955 89.4%
1975 111 99.423 359 2.758 91.8%
1979 109 111.629 347 3.671 89.6%
West Germany: the position of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) 
is in many respects similar to that of the Austrian OGB. Also 
founded in the direct aftermath of the World War II as a Unitarian 
confederation - transcending all religious, polilical and 
occupational divisions that had existed in Germany before 1933 -, it 
has been largely successful in maintaining this position. But 
unlike the Austrian 0GB it has to face competition by some rival 
confederations that have considerable sectoral importance. The most 
important ones are the Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft, 
re-founded in 1945 as a hereditor of white collar unions that had 
existed before 1933 and organizing mainly non-manual workers in the 
private sector (Angestellten), and the Deutsche Beamtenbund, founded 




























































































those who have a special status in terms of job tenure, pension 
rights etc.) While it is questionable whether the DAG can be 
regarded as a proper confederation, the DBB certainly is. Both
organisations entertain cooperative relationships between them, but 
compete with the DG3 for 40.9% and 10.2% respectively of the 
workforce (1930). We know much lass about the Union Leitender 
Angestellte which was founded in 1951 as a confederation of four 
unions organizing managerial staffs. The ULA is thought to 
represent some 30,000-40,000 members (mid-1970s). Finally, along 
religious/political lines a very minor split exists since the 
foundation - in 1955 - of the conservative-catholic Christliche
Gewerkschaftsbund which is estimated o comprise a relatively stable 
membership between 200,000 and 260,000 members. The CGB has 18 
affiliated unions, the most important being the Deutsche Handels- 
und Industrie-angestellten Verein with about 60,000 members.
Table 3: shares of minor confederations in German union membership
% shares in:
total union membership manual Anngestellte Beamte
DAG DBB CGB CGB DAG DHV DBB CGB
1950 4.1 2.2 — — 35.4 — 35.4 _
1960 5.9 8.5 2.5 ca. 1.0 37.3 4.4 50.7 9.0
1970 5.7 8.9 3.0 ca. 1.0 30.6 4.0 48.1 9.1
1980 5.2 8.6 3.1 ca. 1.0 22.3 2.8 44.7 9.2
Norway: Norway is the fourth country in which the trade union




























































































organisation: the Landesorgatiisasjonen i Norge (LO). Like the 0GB, 
DGB and TUC, the Norwegian LO organizes workers throughout the 
economy. No politically rival confederations exist. But in the 
past decennium some rival confederations based on occupational and 
status distinctions have been founded and gained importance: the 
Akademikerners Fellesorganisasjon (1974) and the Yrkesorganisasjonen 
Sentralforbund (1977). The AF organizes mainly academics and 
professional employees, the YS mainly white collar employees but 
also some skilled (craft based) manual worker unions (particularly 
in the oil industry). Unlike the DGB and the TUC, the LO has been 
relatively unsuccessful in keeping pace with the growing 
unionization of white collar employees. Its share in total 
membership has declined from 85.6% in the mid-1950s to 67.8% in 
1980, among non-manual workers from 48.7% in 1965 to 38.2% in 1980. 
Although both AF and YS are still small in terms of membership (in 
1980 they represented 9.6% resp. 9.0% of all union members in 
Norway), they have established a position among non-manual workers 
(now about half of the Norwegian labour force) that equals that of 
the L0 (the AF represents 19.1%, the YS 17% of the unionized 
non-manual employees in 1980).
Sweden and Denmark present cases where the trade union movement is 
clearly split at the confederal level along occupational 
(manual/non-manual) lines. The Danish and Swedish LO's organize 
non-manual union members as well, but since long there have been 
relatively strong confederations of white collar employee unions 



























































































Denmark: the Landesorganisationen i Danmark (LO) recruits both
manual and non-manual workers in the private and public sector. 
However, higher graded white collar employees, civil servants and 
professional employees tend to adhere to ether organisations. The
Faellesraedet______for ______ Danske________Tjenestemands________-og
Funktionaer-organisationer (FTF), a central organisation of white 
collar unions, was founded in 1952 and represents an important part 
of the unionized white collar employees. It occupies the space in 
the middle of the domain of white collar employees, between - at the 
lower end - the LO and - at the higher end - the Central 
Organisation of Professional Employees (AC). This Akademikernes 
Centralorganisation was founded in 1972 (its direct predecessor, the 
AS, a coalition of professional employee unions, dates back to 
1962). In Denmark one finds a rather strict demarcation along 
occupational, or should one better say, educational lines. Given 
one's occupational training and educational credentials, the union 
to which one adheres is also determined. Since 1973 there exists an 
agreement on recruitment and cooperation between the LO and the FTF 
that is fairly well observed. Similar arrangements exist with the 
AC.
Next to these confederation, a fourth organisation, the
Hovedorganisati- n for_____Arbejdleder______-og__________Techniske
Funktionaerforeninger i Danmark (Faellesrepraesentationen) (FR), 
recruits supervisors and technical staffs. Since its foundation it 
has a rather stable membership, recruiting in a domain of its own. 
Like the AC, the FR comprises self-employed members as well. In the 




























































































lower-graded public employees (the so-called "silvercords") in which 
both LO and FTF affiliates as well as some independent unions 
cooperate, CO-II for the higher-graded state functionaries (the 
"goldcords") through which a number of FTF-affiliates arrange their 
bargaining activities. CO-I and CO-II date back to 1909; a similar 
bargaining cartell for teachers' unions (mainly within the FTF), the 
so-called Learernes Centralorganisation (LC), was founded in 1975.
Table 4 shows the decline of the LO-share in total union membership 
due to the increasing unionisation of white collar employees. Note, 
however, that since the early Seventies the LO has managed to 
stabilize its share










1973 72.9 15.7 3.3
1975 71.6 16.1 3.2
1980 71.1 15.6 4.0
AC-share: without self-employed members
The FR represent less than 2% of the total membership.
Sweden: Although the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions, the 
Landesorganisationen i Sverige (LO) is in principle open to both 
blue collar and white collar workers, it has never been successful 
in recruiting the latter category. Only in one particular sector - 
commerce - it recruits the majority of (low graded) non-manual 




























































































municipal employees) do include some while collar employees, but the 
majority of its "industrial sector" unions comprise only manual 
workers. The bulk of the white collar workers in Sweden is 
organized in unions affiliated to the second largest organisation, 
the Tjanstemanr.ens Central organisation (TCO), founded in 1944. 
Between the LO and the TCO little competition exists; they 
cooperate closely and their membership domains are fairly well 
demarcated. The LO faces almost no competition. Only few unionized 
manual workers have remained outside the LO. The older syndicalist 
confederation, Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation (SAC), founded 
in 1909, has a declining membership like the independent union of 
dockers (HBT). The TCO, however, faces competition from a 
confederation of civil servants and professional employee unions, 
the Statstjanstemannens Riksforbund (1917) and Sveriges Akademikers 
Central Organisation (1947), which merged i 1974 (SACO-SR) The 
latter organisation has tried to move into the TCO-domain by 
lowering its admission rules, sometimes with success. The TCO tries 
to secure itself through a close cooperation with the LO, excluding 
the SACO-SR from certain political avenues of access to political 
decision-making. But this has recently led to dissent within the 
TCO, causing the breaking away of two (one very large) unions 
recruiting higher paid professional employees (SALF). In 1979 these 
two unions tried to establish a fifth confederation, but it was 
refused recognition. To sum up, inter-confederal relationships in 
Sweden have so far been characterized by little jurisdictional 
conflict, the domains being fairly strictly demarcated by 
occupational and educational boundaries. Recently, conflictual




























































































have become manifest in, particularly, the domain of higher-paid 
white collar employees.
Table 5 shows fairly well the long-term decline of the LO's share in 
total union-membership, concommittent with the shift from manual to 
non-manual occupations in the Swedish economy and the growing 
unionization of the latter category (from 16% in 1930 to 70% in the 
late 1960s).
Share of confederations in tvtal union membership
L0 TOO SACO-SR SAC (SALF)
1950 79.2 16.7 2.7 1.2
1960 77.0 18.9 3.8 0.9
1970 67.2 26.5 5.0 0.9
1980 60.7 39.8 6.4 0.5 (2.6)
Among the non-manual union members the SACO-SR and SALF hold a 
combined share of just over 20% in 1980.
In the remaining group of countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Italy and France, the national trade union movements are 
characterized by traditionally deep-rooted political and religious 
cleavages, to which occupational (and in the case of Switzerland) 
regional divisions have added themselves. Each country, however, 
presents a rather different picture. For instance, during the past 
decennium confederal relations in the Netherlands are moving towards 
a Swedish-like pattern. The Italian and French patterns of 
division, to whatever extent they may have been similar in the past 
(as they are usually treated in textbooks), have in the past fifteen 




























































































Netherlands: Since its origins the Dutch trade union movement has 
been divided along religious lines. After the establishment of the 
general federation of trade unions, the Ncderlands Verbond van 
Vakverenigingen (NVV), in 1905, the unions organizing catholic and 
protestant workers established their own confederations as well: 
the catholics in a Bureau of Roman-Catholic- Union Federations 
(1919), later the Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond (1964); the 
protestants in the Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (1909). Unlike 
Austria and West Germany, this religious division re-emerged 
completely unchanged aft r the World War II, the only change being 
much closer cooperative relationships between the three. In 
1944-45, when part of the Dutch t' rritory was liberated from the 
German troops, a new confederation, the Eenheids Vakcentrale (EVC), 
was founded in the liberated area. Its original objective was to 
establish a Unitarian trade union centre anchored on factory-based 
unions replacing the occupational and, partly, industrial unions 
that had existed prior to 1940. After the re-establishment of the 
three traditional confederations, and after it had failed ■* o merge 
with the NVV, the EVC became more and more tied to the Communist 
Party. The EVC has been refused recognition by employers and the 
state and in fact, no v. being represented in the post-war corooratist 
institutions, it could not succeed in becoming the fourth 
(syndicalist) centre in the Dutch trade union movement. Though it 
had been as large as the NVV in 1945-46 and had still 160,000 
members, mainly manual workers, in 1950, it declined rapidly and 
dissolved itself in 1958. Another, rather small confederation with 
a conservative— liberal orientatation, the Nederlandse Vakcentrale




























































































managerial staff, also survived only until the early 1960s.
Contrary to the pre-war period, NVV, NKV and CNV operated in close 
cooperation through the Council of Trade Union Centres (Raad van 
Vakcentrales). Apart from a short interruption from 1954 to 1958, 
when the Dutch catholic bishops urged catholics to leave socialist 
and communist organisations, threatening to withold religious 
services from defectants (with remarkably little success, though), 
this cooperation lasted until the mid-1970s. The process of 
de-confessionalisation since the 1960s, which particularly affected 
the catholic confederation, has probably been the strongest force 
behind the endeavours to come to one, Unitarian confederation. In 
the mid-fifties, the catholic and protestant confederations still 
represented one-half of total trade union membership. In 1975 their 
share fell to slightly over one-third. During the same period the 
NVV improved its share from 30% to 40%.
When, finally, the protestant confederation (CNV) decided not to 
join the other two, NVV and NKV formed in 1976 a federation of 
confederations between them. The Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging 
(FNV), became recently - in January 1982 - a fully-fledged 
confederation. At present, all the affiliated unions have now also 
merged. As a consequence of this process towards greater unity, the 
relationships with the CNV have become more conflictual. All 
existing joint ventures have been broken up. The CNV is becoming 
more and more a confederation of white collar unions, especially 
since some former independent catholic unions (teachers, military 




























































































Table 6: Non-manual trade union membership as 
percentage of total membership, 
by confederation, 1950-1982.
in N W in NKV in CNV
1950 20.7 18.4 26.5
1960 24.9 18.3 31.7
1971 24.3 17.7 27.9
1977 27.7 10.8 37.5
1979 31.1 11.2 42.0
1981 — 25.8 ---- ----- 42.1
1982 26.2 49.0
In 1975 a new confederation of white collar unions, the Raad voor 
Middelbaar en Hoger Personeel (RMHP), was born. The former 
NKV-union of supervisors and lower management, that had left the 
catholic confederation because it opposed the federation with the 
NW, joined this new confederation to become its largest affiliate. 
In 1981 6.6% of all union members in the Netherlands were members of 
unions affiliated to the RMHP. Of the non-manual union members this 
percentage amounted to 14.7%.
The axis along which the Dutch trade union movement is divided has 
gradually transformed in an occupational (manual/non-manual) and 
political one. Consequently, inter-confederal relationships are 
becoming more conflictual.
Italy: The split in the Italian trade union is almost purely of a 
political nature, although it may have, at least in its origins, 
some religious aspects too. After the long night of fascisme, the
Italian trade union movement was reconstituted in a unitarion
fashion (Pact of Rome 1944). In the Confederazione Generale
Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) the imain political parties worked




























































































republicans). However, this period of unity did not last long. In 
1947-48 the Christian democrats and the social democrats/republicans 
broke away and constituted their own confederations: the
Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL), the Unione 
Italians del Lavoro (UIL) respectively. The CGIL became entirely 
tied to the communist and socialist parties, the former party having 
a firm majority. Until the end-1960's relations with political 
parties were very tight and competition between the confederations 
severe. Only since the early 1970's the three confederations 
started to cooperate and formed a "Federazione unitaria 
CGIL-CISL-UIL" (Firenze 1972); the linkages to the party system 
have been weakened accordingly. Many affiliated unions co-operate 
now closely through federative structures. The original objective 
of merging into a Unitarian trade union centre has not been 
realized, though, and during the past three, four years tensions 
between the three confederations have been growing.
The cooperation between the three major confederation had a 
stabilizing effect on their relative shares in total membership:
Table 7: membership shares of Italian confederations
CGIL CISL UIL
1950 68.7 18.6 12.7
1955 65.5 21.3 13.2
1960 54.1 28.2 16.0
1965 51.2 33.7 15.1
1970 50.7 34.8 14.5
1975 51.7 35.3 13.0
1980 48.9 35.1 16.0
Outside the three big confederations some independent unions, 




























































































CISNAL, the latter of which is connected with national-fascist 
ideology), exist but it is difficult to assess their numerical 
importance. In some sectors, particularly private and public 
services (banking, transport, health, education), they have some 
strongholds (going up to 30% of total membership in these particular 
sectors).
Switzerland presents, probably together with France, the most 
fragmented picture. Here we find five (recently: four) 
confederations at the national level and one at the regional level. 
Historically, the major split seems to be religious: next to the 
non-religious Sweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund (SGB), the oldest and 
largest confederation, a catholic and a protestant confederation 
were founded at the end of World War I: the Christlich-Nationale 
Gewerkschaftsbund (CNG) and the Schweizerischer Verband 
Evangelischer Arbeitnehmer (SVGA) respectively. The SVEA went broke 
in 1982 and is now defunct; it recommended its membership to join 
the "catholic" CNG. In comparision to the SGB these two 
organisations are rather small (the SGB accounts for about half of 
the Swiss union membership, the CNG for 10%, the SVEA for little 
less than 2%). Over the past decennia their relative shares have 
remained close to constant, indicating a low degree of competition. 
However, the traditional "Zersplitt.erung der Kraefte" of the Swiss 
union movement is not exhausted with this predominantly religious 
cleavage. There exists still a conservative-liberal confederation, 
the Landesverband Freier Schweizer Arbeitnehmer (LSFA), connected 
with the liberal party, that opposes itself to the social democratic




























































































union membership. Slightly more union members are represented 
through a regional confederation, the Fédération Romande des 
employés. Of far more importance is the confederation of white 
collar unions, the Vereinigung SchweizerIsche Angestelltenverbaende, 
in 1980 accounting for 16.6% of Swiss union membership (but 45% of 
all unionized white collar employees).
Despite the high degree of fragmentation, the inter-confederal 
relationships seem to be quite co-operative. Stability seems to be 
the general feature of the Swiss trade union system. Each 
confederation recruits members in its own "niche", for example the 
SGB seems to leave the white collar employees in the private sector 
completely to the VSA. The shares of each confederation in total 
union membership have changed remarkably little, the only 
confederation which shows a slight increase is the VSA, due to the 
growing number of non-manual union members. With respect to 
collective bargaining and representation of members' interests in 
the political area the confederations and their affiliated unions 
entertain co-operative relationships, in some cases also with 
independent unions. A case in point is the Federativ Verbandes des 
Personals oeffentliche Verwaltungen und Betriebe through which seven 
SGB-unions in the public sector cooperate with three independent 
public sector unions. All confederations enjoy recognition and 
representational rights in the Swiss political system (the so-called 
"Vorparlementarisches Verfahren").
In France we find the most divided and conflictual trade union 
system. We can count five to six national trade union centres of 




























































































and, especially, occupational aspects play an additional role. The 
oldest and largest confederation, still accounting for over 
one-third of French union membership, is the Confédération Générale 
du Travail (CGT). It is closely tied to the communist party, a 
minority is connected to the socialist party. In 1947-48 part of 
the CGT, opposing communist dominance, broke away and formed the 
CGT-Force Ouvrière (FO). The catholic confederation, the 
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC), founded 
in 1919 and refounded directly after the liberation of France, 
experienced a major split in 1964 when a large majority decided to 
followed the decision to de-confessionalize and subsequently joined 
the new established Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail, 
which later developed a radical socialist ideology and is now second 
largest. The relationships between all these confederations are 
highly conflictual. There was a short interval of relative peace 
between 1972 and 1977-78 when the CGT and CFDT cooperated in some 
fields in the context of the "Programme Commun" between the Left 
parties. But apart from being only partial, this cooperation never 
excluded, nor weakened the incentives of ungoing compition for 
membership.
Relations with the Confederation of technical and managerial staffs, 
the Confédération Générale des Cadres, recently reconstituted as the 
Confédération Française d1 Encadrement - this organisation originated 
in the 1936-37 during the Popular Front period and was also 
re-founded in 1945 - are equally strained. CGT, CFDT and CGT-FO 
have tried to answer the growth of the CGC by forming their own 
unions of managerial staffs (at odds with their formal committment 




























































































only modest success. In the sector of education an independent 
federation of teachers unions, the Fédération Nationale de 
1'Education (FEN), originally belonging to the CGT but avoiding the 
political split of 1947 by constituting itself as an independent 
federation, has established a quasi-monopoly. This has not 
prevented other confederations, particularly the CFDT, of trying to 
establish their own teachers' unions. Finally, we should mention 
the so-called "autonomous" confederation, the Confédération des 
Syndicats Libres, which is not important numerically, but has some 
important strongholds at firm 1 :vel (particular in the automobile 
sector at Peugeot and Citroen). In 1980 the CFTC represented 
between 4% and 5% of total French union membership, the CGC-CFE 
represented about 8% and the FEN over 10%. Independent unions are 
believed to organize no more than 2% to 3 %. However, the three 
"big" confederations - CGT, CFDT and F0 - hold a smaller share in 
total membership in 1980 than they did in 1970, 1960 or 1950. This 
is almost totally due to the continuous decline of the CGT. The 
high degree of inter-confederal competition can be read from the 





































































































1950 80.2 9.6a 10.2
1955 69.6 15.2a 15.2
1960 66.1 18.5a 15.4
1965 63.3 20.4b 16.3
1970 57.0 22.8 20.1
1975 53.6 25.9 20.5
1980 49.0 25.9 25.2
a = CFTC; b = CFTC + CFDT in 1964 #
The same tendencies are revealed by the data on elections for the 
French enterprise councils: a steady decline of the CGT, a 
strengthening of the CFDT until the mid-1970's; at the same time an 
increasing vote-share for "non-union" and "other-union" 
representatives (see: data in Visser 1984).
To sum up, with respect to unity of national trade union centres we 
can establish three, may~be four types:
1. a highly divided trade union movement in which three or more 
national trade union centres exist. This applies to the cases of 
France and Switzerland, but with the important distinction that in 
France inter-confederal relationships are highly competitive and 




























































































2. a divided trade union movement in which two to three national 
poles exist, but in which competition between these centres is to a 
large extent limited. This applies certainly to the cases of 
Denmark and Sweden, and to a lesser extent to the Netherlands and 
Italy (since the early 1970's).
3. a unified trade union movement in which only one national centre 
or central peak federation exists or is largely dominant. Austria 
is the most pure example of this, but it applies as well to the 
U.K., West Germany and Norway, although one might argue that 
particularly in the case of Norway there is a retarded development 
towards a Danish- and Swedish-like pattern.
(b) Internal fragmentation
So far I have discussed unity between confederations of trade 
unions. A further aspect is their internal unity, that is within 
each confederation. Like unity between confederation, internal 
unity is an important organisational condition with respect to the 
capacity of a trade union movement to co-ordinate its policies 
together with other actors in the industrial relations system. The 
greater the homogeneity of the organizational principles on which 
the confederation is built and the internal unity of its political 
culture, the less difficulties it will have in arriving at and 
implementing a common policy. This organizational and political 
homogeneity should not be confounded with the heterogeneity of 




























































































In priciple, all sources of division regarding the relationships 
between confederations can also contribute to internal competition. 
I will however concentrate on what I see as the two main sources of 
internal disunity and fragmentation. That is (1) competition 
between unions affiliated to the same peak association, and (2) 
political factions existing within confederations and their 
affiliated unions.
The main source of internal competition and fragmentation relates to 
inter-union competition arising from overlapping domains of 
membership. The more the domains of membership of the affiliated 
unions are neatly demarcated, the less space for competition will 
exist. This is very strong related to "industrial unionism" as a 
principle of union organisation, since demarcation by economic 
sectors tend to minimize disputes over recruitment and bargaining 
rights. An additional point is that thus defined domains, 
particularly if large, are less subject to change than domains 
defined by levels of skill, occupational status and the like. Size 
and stability of recruitment domains and bargaining territories tend 
to be inversely related to inter-union strife.
Inter-union competition is never completely absent, not even between 
industrial sector unions. New industrial branches, such as nuclear 
energy, aluminium production, etc , upset old boundaries, once 
neatly drawn, and may give rise to membership disputes. Unions in 
industrial sectors, such as textiles, clothing, mining, etc., 
experiencing a decline of employment and membership may become eager 




























































































or otherwise (HUGHES 1967, UNDY et al. 1981). Some sectors, 
especially those outside the traditional manufacturing industries, 
may be hard to define and each demarcation may and, occasionally, 
will be contested. In particular the "service" sector and the 
"public" sector of the economy in general can, as the evidence from 
different countries shows, be demarcated in many different ways.
This being said, it is still to be expected that inter-union 
competition will be minimized when union domains are demarcated by 
broad economic or industrial sectors. Consequently, in the majority 
of cases conflicts will be confined to bordeline-cases only. The 
incentives for inter-union competition will be highest, however, if 
unions recruit wage- and salary-earners according to different, 
often strongly conflicting, organisational principles. That is, in 
a situation in which craft unions, white collar unions or general 
unions claim the same domains as industrial sector unions.
Of all countries, only in West Germany, with the post-war 
reconstruction of the DGB, the principle of "industrial 
unionism" has fully been instituted. However, the price of 
this strict application in the DGB has been the foundation of a 
rival union centre of white collar employees, the Deutsche 
Angestellten Gewerkschaft (DAG). The DAG, which is not a 
proper confederation but really a catch all white collar union, 
has been refused the affiliation to the DGB in spite of its 
repeated requests, because it was and is unwilling to submerge 
its membership in the white and blue collars organizing 
sectoral unions of the DGB. Within the DGB and between its 
sectoral unions some domain conflicts, of small magnitude, do 
actually exist. (BAIER et al 1981, STREECK 1982).
The structure of its Austrian counterpart, the OGB, comes close 
to the realisation of industrial sector unionism. However, in 
1945 the OGB did exempt white collar employees in the private 
sector of the economy from organizing themselves in sectoral 
unions together with blue collar workers. So, the 
OGB-affiliates are industrial sector unions except for one big 
catch all white collar union, the Gewerkschaft der 
Privatangestellten (GPA), that crosscuts industrial and service 




























































































conflict between the OGB-affiliates, but in recent times some 
manual worker unions in stagnating or even declining 
manufacturing sectors have become increasingly concerned about 
loosing members to the expanding GPA (TRAXLER 1982).
In the Netherlands, a reorganisation of union membership 
domains according to the industrial principle was decided upon 
by the three main confederations, NVV, NKV and CNV, in 1950. 
Only the NVV succeeded in a full implementation, in the course 
of which a union of technical engineers was expelled in 1952. 
Industrial unionism was realized i: the protestant CNV as well, 
but at a much slower pace. Resistence came from within the 
catholic confederation. The KAB, in 1964 renamed NKV, never 
succeeded in integrating its whiie collar union in industry in 
sectoral unions comprising white and blue collar employees. 
Its white collar union in industry left the NKV in 1974, at the 
eve of the confederal decision to federate with the NVV. Since 
the early 1970s there hase been a wave of mergers between 
unions into "multi-industrial" or "conglomerate" unions in all 
three confederations. For example, unions in textiles, 
metalworking, el-ctronic and chemical production, as well as 
miscellanous industries, merged in one conglomerate union 
(Industriebond). In the public sector the same process gave 
rise to one general "public employee" union, comprising blue 
and white collar employees of the central and local government 
as well as parts of public industry and state-subsidized 
services (e.g , health and social security, universities, post 
office workers, central and local government, gas, water and 
electricity workers, all public transport except railways, 
custom office employees). In the 1970's jurisdictional 
conflicts between unions belonging to the same confederation 
occurred frequently, for instance between the Industriebonden 
and the unions in the food processing industry, or between 
unions who have tried to invade the poorly organized private 
service sector (TEULINGS et al. 1984). Open conflict, however, 
has remained the exception.
The Swiss trade union confederations, in particular the SGB and 
CNG, are committed to the principle of "industrial unionism" as 
well. But there are many exceptions to the rule, especially in 
the public sector and some older trades such as printing. The 
SGB has showed to be manifestly impotent in reorganizing its 
affiliates. Moreover, white collar employees in the private 
economy, e.g , manufacturing, construction, banking, insurance 
and commerce, if organized at all, have remained almost 
completely outside the unions affiliated to the SGB and the CNG 
(HOPFLINGER 1980).
In Sweden the L0 took already as early as 1906 the decision to 
reorganize its affiliates in industrial sector unions. But it 
has taken more than sixty years to implement this decision. 
According to one author, in 1908 nearly one-half (46%) of all 
LO-members were organized in industrial unions. In 1953 this 
proportion had risen to 78%, in 1975 to 85% (K0RPI 1978). On 
the other hand, with few exceptions, most notably the minor 
syndicalist confederation SAC and the union of managerial 




























































































trade unions have traditionally confined themselves to their 
original domains and there have been few whose membership "has 
straddled across more than one sector of industry" (BAIN & 
PRICE 1980: 139). Of course, in comparision with other 
countries, one has to consider that the Swedish union movement, 
like the Danish one, was already vertically divided in an early 
stage. So, a typical industrial union in Sweden comprises only 
either the manual workers (if belonging to the L0) or the 
non-manual employees (if belonging to the TCO) in that 
particular industry, unlike there counterparts in, say, Germany 
or the Netherlands.
The Norwegian L0 adopted the "industry" principle in 1923, but 
it is still far less implemented than in the Swedish L0. The 
Norwegian L0 is composed of a relatively large number of small 
unions which are partly based on occupational distinctions. 
Within the L0 inter-union conflict seems to be contained, 
however, in particular because collective bargaining takes 
place through relatively stable and well-defined bargaining 
cartells in which groups of unions cooperate.
The Danish L0 has never been able to convince its affiliates to 
restructure themselves according to demarcation by broad 
economic sectors, let alone to impose such a principle upon 
them. Indeed, several LO-congresses have taken decisions in 
favour of industrial unions, for instance in 1967 when it was 
decided to create 9 industrial unions, or in 1971 when this 
decision was repeated but modified !o the effect that white 
collar employees were exempted and got the permission to 
maintain or create their own union structures, as in the 
Austrian case. In the Danish L0 we still find a mixture of 
craft- or occupational unions (e.g., the metalworker's union, 
LO's third largest affiliate), general workers' unions (such as 
the female workers' union or the largest LO-affiliate: the 
general union of unskilled manual workers), and industrial or 
sectoral unions. There have repeatedly been conflicts between, 
for instance, the metalworkers' union and the general unions 
over the policies to be adopted by the L0, especially regarding 
wage policies and central agreements with employers and 
governments. However, overt inter-union conflict seems to be 
somewhat counteracted by the existence, like in Sweden and 
Norway, of "bargaining cartells".
In the United Kingdom the same mixture of different union types 
exist within the TUC, but in this case this has always been 
associated with perpetious conflicts between unions with 
respect to recruitment and bargaining rights. Though the TUC 
encourages union-mergers and, in fact, many mergers have taken 
place since the law was changed in 1964, inter-union 
competition has remained quite strong. Despite "Briddlington" 
agreements and the like, the TUC does not seem empowered to 
authoritatively settle disputes between its affiliates, 
certainly not when any of its larger and potent affiliates is 
involved.
Different is the situation in Italy and France. In both 
countries the unions affiliated to the general confederations 




























































































respect to agriculture, the manufacturing industries and 
construction. Recently a procès of mergers ("accorpomento") 
has been initiated in all three confederation in order to 
realize a rationalized sectoral structure in the private and 
public services as well. In France sectoral demarcation has 
always been mixed with occupational unionism ("syndicalisme du 
metier") and factory unionism ("syndicats d'usine"). Although 
officially committed to "industrial unionism", this does seem 
to have little significance in France. Despite recent 
initiatives towards union-mergers (in the CFDT and FO), a large 
space for inter-union competition still exists.
With respect to political factionalism the best indicator is whether 
or not stable political factions, related to the party-system, are 
allowed and do in fact exist within confederations. Additionally, 
one would like to know to what extent competition between these 
factions exist, whether or not this competition is institutionalized 
or - instead - of a more open and conflictual type and related to 
different views on the confederation's policies, open leadership 
contests,, etc. Of the ten countries discussed in this paper, open 
and recognized political factionalism within confederations exists 
only in Austria, Italy and France. It can be argued, however, that 
within the TUC inter-union competition has changing political 
aspects as well (Hyman 1983, Undy et al. 1981). All the four 
political parties are represented in the Austrian OGB and allowed to 
form their own factions. Competition between these factions is 
however to a high degree institutionalized and the leadership of the 
SPO (the socialist party) hardly ever contested. Although the 
linkages between confederations and political parties in Italy have 
weakened in the early 1970's, factions (parties and party-wings) are 
known to exist in all confederations and do affect their actions. 
At the leadership-level of each confederation a complicated balance 




























































































an important role. Thus far, open contests appear to have been 
avoided. An even more complicated political balance is attempted to 
be upheld within the "Federazione unitaria CGIL-CISL-UIL". In the 
French confederations, particularly in the CGT and the CFDT, 
factions based on political parties and party-wings, but perhaps 
even more important, between such partisan factions and those who 
oppose the strong ties to political parties, play a considerable 
role. They make themselves felt in union conferences, leadership 
contests and, occasionally, open oppositi ,n to confederal policies.
Most typically inter-union conflict is caused by overlapping 
membership domains and competitions for members, or by party 
factionism. There are oLher causes as well: unions often compete 
for influence within their confederation, one reason being that they 
represent different sectors and groups of the workforce and, 
accordingly, have different perceptions of the confederal policies 
to be pursued. In the near future an increasingly important source 
of division, within industrial sector unions, might be one based on 
company-structures, firm-size and regional location, but the impact 
on confederal structures and policies is yet difficult to predict.
Already dilineating itself - at least in some countries and within 
some confederations - is a division between affiliated unions 
representing employees in either the private or public sector of the 
economy. Public employee unionism has grown at a fast speed, 
especially since the early 1970's, whereas the older manual unions 
in manufacturing, which originally had founded the confederation and 




























































































stagnating and even declining membership. Today's trade union 
movements in Western Europe are less and less predominated by manual 
workers defending their interests against private capital. The 
post-war period, but particularly the 1970's, show a conspicuous 
increase of white collar unionization in both the private and public 
parts of the economy. As can be seen from Table 9 on the next page, 
white collar employees, privately and publicly employed, now amount 
to between two-fifth and one-half of all unionized wage- and 
salary-earners. Generally, their proportion in total confederal 
membership is somewhat lower, since a considerable part of the 
growth of white collar employment has benefited independent unions 
and newly established union centres. I return to this shortly. It 
should also be noted, that the variation in the proportion of white 
collar employees in total confederal membership is, obviously, 
related to the existence or non-existence of an established




































































































Austria 41^4 ( '52) 44.6 ( ’63) 48.3 ( '72) 52.9 ( ’78)
Denmark 27.6 ( *55) 29.6 39.2 T B lIO O 48.6 } sassoni
LO 14.1 ( ' 55) 16.7 20.9 30.1
FTF 100.0 1 no Q nli100.0 n i  n99c 100.0 100.0 f To 3iT.sq
Norway _ ?ycIqmo yv 31.6 ( '65) 35.6 47.2 ' . l o o  alidw
LO - 18.7 ( ’65) 20.9 26.0gfiw hi m o i a i j 1 o  i  1 k Ï.B DJ I i: 1 — OWCf iîeswjsd od
Netherlands 29.4 36.7 37.4 44.9 ( '81)
FNV fort n i  i' 26.2 ( '82)
NVV 20.7 24.9 24.3
NKV 18.4 18.3 17.7 nnoa ax c{xtia'iedmem
CNV 26.5 31.7 27.9 49.0
lem yo iqm e ■rB f  l o o e  ■ i dw l o  d J  WOT:g
Sweden 24.8 30.2 37.6 44.2
LO 6.6 8.5 8.5 8.9 y I  wen bn c
TCO 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
o n o i l ' : lo q o n .q  srî;. ?.lS B X Tfi;v  sett f a r * J. JS D1 ü Oli 3
West Germany 25.0 ( '51) 31.8 ( ’61) 36.0 ( '71) 42.1 ( ’81)
DGB 16.7 ( ' 51 ) 19.4 ( ' 61 ) 24.2 ( ’71) 32.0 (  *81)
U.K. 23.4 C51) 26.7 ( *61) 33.2 ( ’71) 40.3 C79)
TUC - - - -
. s a p y o l sn a b e 'in o D
Switzerland - 30.4 34.1 37.0
SGB - 4.3 5.4 6.7
CNG - - - 5.0
VSA 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
No information available for Italy and France.





























































































As with respect to the division manual/non-manual, the emergence of 
public employee unionism, which can be seen as part of the white 
collarization process mentioned above, has changed the composition 
of most confederations as well. About one-third, on average, of all 
members of the main European union confederations are employed in 
the public sector (central and local government, public services and 
industries). In all confederations, with the only exception of the 
Danish LO, among the three largest affiliates is now one potent 
public employee unions.
One can only speculate about the impact of this changes on the 
internal confederal unity and the confederation's capacity to arrive 
at a common policy. In the past, possibilities of conflict seem to 
have been attenuated by the acceptance of the wage leadership of the 
main unions in manufacturing, in particular the metalworkers. In 
some countries the technique of indexing the salaries of public 
employees to the main collective agreements in the private sector 
was used to the same effect. As long as the relatively high rate of 
economic growth permitted this routine, without making the 
wage-leading unions feel too restrained in their bargaining 
activities, there was little reason for both private and public 
sector unions to quarrel. But with rising public deficits and 
governments that want to cut high inflation rates, private sector 
unions have increasingly expressed their unhappiness with 
traditional policies that may turn them into hostages and, at any 
rate, limit their bargaining freedom to a considerable effect. On 
the other hand, many public employee unions have learned to use the 




























































































recent times. In the face of the deep and protracted economic 
recession of the late seventies, in particular hitting the 
employment prospects in manufacturing, unions in the private sector 
may adhere, with whatever reluctance, to "privatization" policies. 
As a consequence one would expect confederal policies to become torn 
apart between their public and private sector affiliates. In recent 
years there have been some indications of internal tensions which 
may be seen in this perspective. But is difficult to tell in 
advance where, so to speak, the threshold lies and where peak 
associations become dominated by their public employee unions. 
Certainly, their numerical importance, in both absolute and relative 
terms, in vertially all confederations has fastly increased, 
especially in the 1970's as Table 10 clearly shows. From 1960 to 
1980 the proportion of public employees in confederal membership has 
gone up, on average, from one-fourth to one-third, but there remain
































































































TUG (1) 39.0 (1948) 46.9 (1974) 43.7 (1979)
Netherlands
FNV - - 34.2 (1981)
NVV 21.4 28.2 (1971) 37.6 (1979)
NKV 14.4 13.7 (1971) 20.5 (1979)
CNV 27.8 35.0 (1971) 50.8 (1981)
Sweden
L0 - 27.0 33.3
TCO - 46.0 52.5
Norway
L0 23.3 26.1 32.9 (1979)
Austria
0GB 27.3 ( '62-'65) 29.7 ('70-'73) 32.2 (1978)
West Germany
DGB 26.1 26.8 (1961) 29.0 (1981)
Switzerland
SGB 25.2 26.2 25.6
Italy
CGIL 7.5 10.0 15.5
CISL 31.6 27.7 26.9
UIL - 22.2 23.5
Denmark
LO - - 10.1
FTF - 57.8
(1) including mining, nationalized steel industry excluded; 
calculated for the total union membership (including 
non-TUC) in the U.K.
No information available for France.
(c) Associational Monopoly
Associational monopoly refers to the share the major confederations 




























































































it is an easy quantifiable concept. Of course, this is only one 
aspect of monopoly. One could also think of the number of 
collective agreements negotiated by affiliated unions compared to 
the total number of collective agreements. Or the number of seats 
they occupy in representational bodies and committees. Given the 
problem of finding good comparative data on these aspects of 
confederal monopoly, I have confined myself to membership 
representation only.
In Table 11 I have summarized this aspect both per confederation and 
per country, showing the confederal share's from 1950 to 1980. We 
observe that in all countries seven out of every ten members are 
represented through the major confederations. In some countries 
this is even 9 out of every 10 members: Austria (where the 0GB 
maintains a complete monopoly), Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and, close to it. Denmark, Remarkable is also the position the 
German DGB holds on its own, in particular if we look at its decline 
during the first ten years of its existence. Though associational 
monopoly has remained at a high level, in some countries we observe 
a marked decline, in particular if we look at the oldest, largest 
and most general confederations such as the LO's in the Scandinavian 
countries, to a lesser extent the SGB and the three Dutch 
confederations taken together, and more dramatically the CGIL and 
the CGT, although the two cases are quite different. It appears 
that the closer cooperation between the Italian confederation in the 





























































































Table 11: Associational Monopoly of Major Confederations, 1950-1980 
(% shares of confederations in total union membership)
country 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 average 
•70-'81
Austria:




84.3 84.8 83.7 85.9 89.4 91.8 89.6 90.2
West Germany:
DGB 93.7 94.2 82.5 82.0 82.4 83.4 83.1 83.0
Norway: 
L0 - 85.6 83.4 81.6 79.2 72.6 67.8 73.8a
Sweden
L0 79.2 77.0 75.3 71.2 67.2 62.8 60.7 62.9
TC0 16.7 18.9 20.1 23.3 26.5 31.3 29.8 30.1
96.0 95.9 95.3 94.5 93.7 93.9 90.5 93.0
Denmark
L0 84.5 80.9 80.1 77.3 73.5 71.6 71.1 72.3a
FTF 7.1 12.0 - 15.0 16.1 15.6 15.9a
92.1 88.5 87.7 86.7 88.2
Italy
CGIL 65.3 59.0 48.7 47.4 48.2 49.1 46.0 48.0
CISL 17.7 19.2 25.4 31.2 33.1 33.5 33.0 33.3
UIL 12.1 11.9 14.4 14.0 13.8 12.4 15.0 13.6
95.0 90.0 90.5 92.5 95.0 95.0 94.0 95.0
Switzerland
SGB - - 57.6 55.1 52.5 50.8 49.3 50.8
CNG - - 11.2 12.1 12.1 12.2 11.9 12.0
VSA - - 14.4 15.7 15.9 16.0 16.6 16.3
83.2 82.9 80.5 79.0 78.8 79.1
Netherlands
NVV 32.9 37.9 35.9 36.0 36.9 40.0 42.0 40.3
NKV 25.5 29.6 29.6 37.8 26.2 21.1 18.2 21.6
CNV 13.4 16.3 16.2 15.7 15.7 13.3 17.1 15.2
71.8 83.8 81.7 79.5 78.8 74.4 77.2 77.1
France
CGT 74.7 61.5 58.4 53.5 44.1 40.8 36.4 39.9
CFDT 9.0b 13.5b 16.0b 17.2c 17.7 19.7 19.2 19.1
FO 9.5 13.5 13.6 13.8 15.6 15.7 18.9 16.6
93.2 88.5 86.6 84.5 77.4 76.0 74.3 75.6




























































































If we compare associational monopoly with regard to manual and 
non-manual union membership seperatedly, we see that the problem for 
most general confederations has been to keep pace with the growing 
unionization of non-manual employees. Most confederations have 
succeeded in maintaining a virtual monopoly with respect to union 
oranization of manual workers:
Table 12: Associational 
(% shares of 
total manual
Monopoly Manual Labour, 
major confederations in 
union membership)
1950-1980
1950 1960 1970 1975 1980
Sweden
L0 98.4 98.7 98.5 98.9 99.1
West Germany
DGB 100.0 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5
Norway
L0 - - 97.2 97.4 97.1
Denmark
L0 - 96.3 94.8 95.8 96.7
Netherlands
FNV - - - - 81.2d
NVV 36.9 42.7 47.0a 51.5b 51.4c
NKV 29.5 38.2 33.8a 30.6b 28.6c
CNV 14.0 17.5 17.4a 16.0b 18.Od
80.4 98.4 98.2a 98.1b 99.2d
Switzerland
SGB - 76.0 73.4 71.8 71.9
CNG - 14.3 16.2 16.6 16.5
90.3 89.6 88.4 88.4
(a) = 1971; (b) = 1977; (c) = 1979; (d) = 1981.
Figures for the UK, Italy and France are not available . We
assume that in the UK the TUC represents between 95% to 100% of
manual union members. The three Italian confederations reach about 
the same level. In the Italian case a disaggregation by broad 
economic sector is possible: the throe major confederations hold a 
quasi-monopoly in industry and agriculture. My guess for France 
would be that the CGT, CFDT and FO together account for about 90% of 
all manual union members. Most of the other confederations in 





























































































If we now turn to non-manual workers we see not only much lower 
levels of associational monopoly, but also more variety from country 
to country. Contrary to the quasi-stability we could observe with 
respect to manual workers, we see that the confederal representation 
of non-manual workers is far more fluctuating. This may be a good 
indicator of competition, to which I return below.
Table 13: Associational Monopoly Non-Manual Labour, 1950-1980
confederation 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980
West Germany
DGB 63.0a 48.9b 54.0 60.5 61.8
Sweden
L0 21.0 21.2 15.3 13.0 12.2
TC0 68.0 66.4 70.4 74.0 67.4
89.0 87.6 85.7 87.0 79.6
Denmark










L0 - 48.7c 46.5 39.9 38.2
Switzerland
SGB - 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.9
CNG - 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5
VSA - 47.5 46.3 45.6 45.0
57.7 56.6 55.9 56.4
Netherlands
FNV - - - - 34.4(
NVV 23.1 24.4 25.2e 26.3f 29.2j
NKV 16.0 14.7 12.le 5.Of 4.6{
CNV 12.1 13.9 11.2e 12.8f 16.0(
51.2 52.0 48.5 44.1 50.4<
(a) = 1951; (b) = 1961; (c) = 1965; (d) = 1981; (e) = 1971;
(f) = 1977; (g) = 1979.
If my earlier assumptions regarding the share of the TUC and the 
major Italian and French confederations among manual workers are 
correct, then it would follow that the TUC represents about 80% of 
all non-manual union members, the three Italian confederations 
between 80% and 90% and the three French centres between 50% and 60% 
(this estimates are based on their shares in total aggregate union 
membership and the distribution between manual and non-manual union 




























































































this estimates have to be taken with caution, since figures on 
non-manual union membership are scarsely available).
(d) External competition
To what extent do the national trade union centres face external 
competition by independent uni< n organisations? External 
competition is more or less the reverse of associational monopoly. 
But it does make sense to give it some separate consideration in 
order to draw a more complete picture of the position of the major 
trade union centres in a given country. If their constituent unions 
are repeatedly or increasingly challenged by successful outside 
compititors, union confederations will have a more difficult job in 
co-ordinating their affiliates. This seems to me an important 
variable: outside competition is often cited as the reason why an 
affiliate does not go along with a centralized confederal policy, or 
sees itself forced to break away from such a policy once it has been 
decided upon by the peak association.
As an indicator of external competition one could look at the 
position of "independent" unions or federations of unions, in 
particular, their share in union membership in particular sectors of 
the economy. This would require a further disaggregation of union 
membership and a comparision of the position of the unions 
affiliated to the major confederations with that of "independent" 
unions at the sectoral level. A reasonable proxy could be to look 
at the different growth rates, that is, whether independent unions 




























































































with information about the age of such unions. One would expect 
relatively young (new) unions to be aggressive in order to establish 
themselves firmly. Although some data have been collected, I have 
yet not been able to compile comparative data for the ten countries 
considered. For this reason I restrict myself to a less strict 
measure, that is external competition with respect to non-manual 
workers. As the tables on associational monopoly showed, outside 
competition for manual workers is almost absent (though a sectoral 
analysis could show that in some areas it is relevant), whereas 
"independent" unionism among white collar employees is far more 
wide-spread. One could also look at the "public sector" separately. 
As a general rule, the position of the major confederations is 
stronger in the private sector than in the public sector, but 
stronger among public employees than among non-manual workers 
(private + public). The latter fact is accounted for by the 
monopoly position the large confederations usually hold among manual 
workers in the public sector (in particular: postal services, 
railways and other public transport).
The strongest external sectoral competition can be observed in 
Norway, directly followed by France. The share of the 
Norwegian LO among non-manual union members has declined 
rapidly and now over 50% of the unionized white collar 
employees are organized independently from the LO. A further 
indication of competition is that some LO-affiliates have 
recently left the confederation. In the public sector the LO 
represents still a constant (since 1965) share of 65% of all 
unionized public employees. The French confederations face 
strong competition from the CFE, which presumably organizes the 
majority of the unionized "cadres" in the French industry and 
service sector. They face heavy competition in the public 
sector as well.
Less but still high external competition is felt by the major 
Dutch, Swiss and German confederations. Since the 1960's the 




























































































members has constantly declined and only recently they have 
succeeded in establishing a feeble majority. Switzerland shows 
a more stable pattern, with few white collar employees 
unionized anyway. In Germany the DGB faces strong competition 
from both the DAG and the DBB, with growing success if we look 
at the DGB1s share in non-manual union membership (from under 
50% in 1960 to over 60% in 1981). In these thr' e countries the 
major confederations have established a higher share among 
union members in the public sector: 70.8% by the DGB (1981), 
65% in the Netherlands (1981, FNV and CNV together) and close 
to 60% in Switzerland (1980, SGB plus CNG).
In Sweden, the UK and Italy about 4 out of 5 non-manual union 
members are reprented by the major confederations, in Denmark 
slightly less. In the public sector they represent even higher 
shares (9 out of 10 in Denmark and Sweden, somewhat less in 
Italy and the UK). Relations with independent unions are very 
conflictual, though, in Italy and the UK.
The position of the Austrian 0GB - it goes almost without 
saying - differs from all others by its complete monopoly and 




























































































Now I want to draw together the four dimensions of associational 
monopoly and unity by constructing one indicator.
Indicator: a compound score of (a) unity or division of national 
trade union movement (number and relationships between 
main central peak federations), internal fractionalism 
in national trade union confederation(s),
(c) percentage of trade union members represented by 




1 = highly divided national trade union movement: three and more 
national trade union centres, with conflictual relationships 
3 = divided national trade union movement: two or three national 
trade union centres with co-operative relationships 
5 = unified national trade union movement: one national trade 
union centre
(b) Internal Factionalism within union centres
0.5 = heavy factionalism within confederation(s), along
political lines between stable and competing factions 
within the confederation, and/or demarcation-desputes 
between affiliated unions accompanied by competition 
for members
1.5 = moderate factionalism within confederation(s), stable
political factions do exist but competition is small and 
institutionalized, and/or some demarcation disputes 
between affiliates does exist
2.5 = no factionalism within national confederation(s)
(c) Associational Monopoly
= percentage of total union members represented by major 
confederations, average 1970-1980/81
(d) External Compitition by independent unions
0.5 = strong sectoral competition by independent unions,
representing more than 50% of union membership among 
non-manual employees and/or in the public sector
1.5 = moderate sectoral competition by independent unions,
representing about 20% of union membership among non- 
manual employees and/or in the public sector




























































































Table 14: ASSOCIATIONAL MONOPOLY and UNITY












Austria 5 1.5 2.5 100.0 90.0 (90.0) 1 (1)
West Germany 5 2.5 1.0 83.0 70.6 (70.1) 2 (4)
Sweden 3 2.5 2.0 93.0 69.8 (71.5) 3 (2)
UK 5 0.5 1.5 90.2 63.1 (54.4) 4 (6)
Denmark 3 2.0 2.0 88.2 61.7 (64.5) 5 (5)
Norway 5 2.5 0.5 73.8 59.0 (70.9) 6 (3)
Italy 3 1.0 1.5 95.0 52.3 (31.7) 7 (9)
Netherlands 3 2.0 1.0 77.1 46.3 (49.0) 8 (7)
Switzerland 2 2.0 1.0 79.1 39.6 (41.6) 9 (8)
France 1 1.0 0.5 75.6 18.9 (26.0) 10 (10)
Between brackets I have added the scores (computed by applying the same 
method) and the respective rankorders for 1960.
compound score = (a + b + d) . c
The trade union movements in Austria, West-Germany and Sweden are highly 
unified and have maintained a high degree of representational monopoly as 
well. The union movements in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Italy 
form an intermediate group. The union movements in the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and France come out low.
A comparision with 1960 shows that the Norwegian LO suffered a significant 
loss in its monopoly over the trade union movement in that country during 
the two decades that followed, whereas the TUC and in particular the Italian 





























































































By organisational centralisation is meant the extent to which trade 
union organisations are federated or joined into strong central 
bodies at the national level with substantial executive and 
representational powers capable of negotiating with central 
employers associations and of dealing with governments on behalf of 
their members. This aspect has received the most attention in the 
literature. The possibility of confederations to co-ordinate their 
members' behaviour (that is, their affiliates) and to exercise
authority over them is very central to the question whether a
national trade union movement will be able to engage in or to
sustain incomes policies, trade-offs with central employers 
associations and governments, etc. So, central to the investigation 
of organisational centralisation is the relationship between 
confederations and their constituent national unions, in particular, 
whether a confederation can exercise authority over their 
affiliates, take binding decisions on their behalf, represent them 
vis-a-vis others etc. This point has rightly been stressed by 
Windmuller (1975, pp.91-92) in his critique of the loose usage of 
the terms "weak" and "strong" with regard to confederations. 
Organisational centralisation as used in this context should not be 
confused with "olicharchic rule" in general, with questions like 
whether or not the confederation is run autocratically, to what 





























































































It should be recalled that virtually everywhere confederations are 
federations of autonomous union organisations. Whatever 
organisational power, rights of representation, and internal 
authority a confederation has acquired, normally these powers, 
rights and authority are delegeted to them by the constituent 
unions. Usually, it are the unions who negotiate collective 
agreemements with employers and sign them. Direct participation of 
confederations in collective bargaining, let alone signing 
collective agreements, is very much the exception to the rule. The 
only really exceptional case I know of is the Austrian OGB, which 
has been constituted as an organisation of which the national unions 
are more or less functional subdivisions instead of constituent 
affiliates. In Austria one is member of the OGB and not of one of 
its fifteen unions. It is the OGB that di'-ectly receives the 
membership dues and exerts complete financial control over its 
unions (the so-called Finanzhoheit). The OGB distributes a part of 
its income to its unions, instead of the other way round as is usual 
in all other confederation. And although it are the unions which 
formally negotiate and sign contracts with employers, the OGB 
retains far-reaching powers in this crucial field too.
One way of measuring the "empowerment" of a confederation is to look 
at the voting procedures and the distribution of votes among 
affiliates, the allocation of tasks between unions and 
confederations, the task-specialisation within the confederation, 
etc. Another important point of investigation would be whether or 
not confederations have the right to interfere in the internal 




























































































admission rights, voting procedures, bringing about mergers settling 
inter-union disputes, etc.). Undoubtedly, the most crucial area of 
confederal interference is that of union-management bargaining. Are 
the central peak associations empowered to intervene in collective 
bargaining processes, i.e. to vet and coordinate the bargaining 
activities of their affiliates? This is more than just asking 
whether or not they have the (constitutional) right of doing so. 
The main point is whether or not they possess the means in terms of 
sanction power vis-a-vis their affiliates, of strike control, of 
human and material resources, etc.
There are several forms through which a national confederation can 
be involved in pay bargaining and may co-ordinate and control the 
bargaining activities of its members (ILO 1973, OECD 1979). Direct 
bargaining by confederations and/or complete dependency of union­
bargaining on the approval by their confederations is the most 
far-reaching form of confederal bargaining authority, but 
exceptional. Until 1963 this has been the case in the Netherlands, 
at present only the OGB has retained such powers. A second, 
slightly weaker form is found when confederations negotiate binding 
central agreements that leave only a circumscribed space for 
union-bargaining. This has been practiced in Norway and Sweden, but 
in Sweden with increasing difficulties as it seems. Some examples 
we find in Denmark in the 1970's but with significant interruptions, 
in the Netherlands in 1972 and, in a much weaker sense, in 1982. 
Central, interconfederal agreements have been reached in Italy as 




























































































1983), and although they considerably affect pay bargaining, these 
agreements are not strictly binding with respect to sectoral- and 
company-level bargaining in the Italian three-tier system of 
collective bargaining.
Intermediate forms of confederal control over union-bargaining 
reside in internal control mechanisms. Presumably the most 
important of these is a confederal procedure of ratification of 
union negotiated contracts, especially if it replaces direct 
member-control and voting procedures within the unions (as is the 
case in the Swedish LO and was the case, until 1972, in the Dutch 
NVV). Other internal controls can be exercised by wage guidelines 
and through the coordination of the union demands before (and 
during) the bargaining process (in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, to a moderate extent also in Italy and West-Germany). 
The timing of contract-renewals is very important, which makes it 
also possible that one large union plays de facto this co-ordinating 
role through its wage-leadership (e.g., the cases of the German I.G. 
Metall and the Federazione Lavoratori Metalmeccanici in Italy). 
With regard to all these forms of confederal involvement in pay 
bargaining it is important to distinguish between regular, 
institutionalized and repeated confederal involvement and ad-hoc 
interventions in crises, as was very much the case in Great Britain 
between 1973 and 1977, or in Italy in January 1983. If the former 
condition applies, it is indeed very likely that "authority 
gravitates from national unions to national centres" (WINDMULLER 
1975, p.98).




























































































sense. Of course it may still be the case that union bargaining 
decisions are still relatively centralised, but now on the level of 
the individual unions (or groups of unions). Surely, it does make a 
difference whether national union officials or plant representatives 
bargain. Confederal coordination and intervention will almost 
certainly be more difficult in the latter
case.
To sum up, a direct measurement of centralisation of the trade union 
movement at the top level involves a set of indicators by which we 
measure the degree to which the peak associations are empowered to 
steer, to control and to coordinate the behaviour of their 
affiliates, in particular the external relationships the affiliates 
are engaged in, of which union-management pay bargaining must be 
considered the most crucial and critical one. We must identify 
organizational properties, characteristics of the organization 
pertaining to the relationship between the confederations and its 
affiliates, that can explain behavioral outcomes. In other words, 
one should not bring observations with respect to bargaining 
behaviour or "action" variables into the indicator, if the indicator 
is meant to explain such behavioral outcomes.
Given the present state of the research and the incomplete data-set, 




























































































of organisational centralisation that was proposed by HEADEY. He 
used an additive index based on the central confederation's powers 
over bargaining and strikes, its financial resources and the size of 
its staff. In the following I will use this indicator, suggest some 
changes, and add, correct and update data.
(a) Level of collective bargaining for pay
The level at which pay bargaining usually takes place is an indirect 
indicator of confederal power over union-bargaining. It can be 
argued that there exists a rough correspondence between high 
organisational centralisation and the prevalence of national over 
sectoral, and of sectoral over regional, in plant and workplace 
bargaining respectively (BLYTH 1979, p.75). In his 1970 article,
HEADEY has proposed to take the level of pay bargaining as an 
indicator for uni' n centralisation, his hypothesis being that 
"national level negotiation is a pre-requisite for significant 
confederation intervention". "It seems unlikely", he continues, 
"that any confederation, (....) could hope to coordinate the 
numerous agreements produced by sub-national bargaining. It would 
be an organisational impossibility." (HEADEY 1970, p.421). It is 
not fully clear what HEADEY exactly meant by "national level". At 
some points in his text - when he actually rates the different 
countries according to this indicator - he seems to define it as 
national bargaining across sectors as opposed to bargaining by 
sector of the economy (or, simply, union bargaining). Elsewhere he 




























































































or plant and workplace bargaining. It seems to me important to 
distinguish between the two cases. It is only the second case which 
leads to the "numerous" agreements which are almost impossible to 
co-ordinate by any confederation. My second point would be that it 
is important to distinguish between the level at which bargaining 
takes place and the type of union officials who participa!e in this 
bargaining (CLEGG 1976). One can have bargaining at the regional 
level but conducted by national union officials, as is the case in 
West-Germany. The same applies to the company bargaining in some 
large firms in the Netherlands that do not participate in sectoral 
agreements. In Italy too, national union officials are involved in 
plant bargaining, especially since the latter half of the 1970's. 
This differs from the situation in which regional- or plant-level 
bargaining processes remain basically under control of regional or 
workplace representatives or in which negotiation decisions are 
shared between national officials and plant representatives (U.K., 
France and, to some extent, Italy).
I think it makes sense to weigh this indicator by the impact of 
collective pay bargaining in the national economy. This impact is 
somehow measured by the proportion of the dependent labour force 
which is unionized (union density rate). From the extent to which 
the workforce is organized in unions we can gather some idea about 
the impact of union bargaining. Of course, as a rule collectively 
bargained agreements extend beyond the unionized part of the 
workforce. Several devices exist by which, legally or otherwise, 
agreements are extended to the non-organized workforce and, less 




























































































rates still are a good comparative measure for the difference of the 
impact of collective bargaining aci'oss countries.
Table 15: Union density rates 1950-1980
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 average 
'70-'81
Sweden (a) 67.7 70.8 73.0 74.9 73.6 79.5 87.7 80.8
Denmark 51.9 54.3 59.6 60.8 64.0 68.9 78.9b 68.8b
Norway (c) 58.5d 61.4e 61.5 62.5 61.8 60.5 63.8 60.4c
Austria 62.7 63.9 63.5 63.0 62.1 58.5 58.4 59.If
U.K. 44.1 44.5 44.2 44.2 48.5 51.0 53.2 51.4
Italy 45.8 39.4 26.5 27.4 33.1 42.4 43.3 40.5f
Netherlands 39.0 37.4 38.7 37.4 37.5 40.1 38.8 39.2
West-Germany 33.1 37.2 37.1 36.5 36.3 37.9 38.7 37.9
Switzerland - - 30.3 - 29.2 33.4 33.5 32.1
France - - 19.8g 19.6 23.3 23.1 20.2 22.5
Union density rates = union members as percentage of "potential 
membership", i.e. wage & salary earners plus unemployed; 
calculated by excluding pensioners, small farmers, 
self-employed etc. from union membership data.
(for definitions and data: VISSER 1984)
(a) = density rates for Sweden before 1970 are overstated, since 
pensioneers could not be excluded from reported membership data;
(b) = 1979, average 1970-1979; (c) = density rates till 1970 
overstated, average calculated for 1972-1980; (d) = estimate;
(e) = 1956, (f) = average 1970-1980; (g) = 1962.
The other measures of organisational centralisation are (b) 
confederal control over strikes, (c) confederal staff resources, and 
(d) confederal financial resources.
(b) Confederal control over union strike decisions
Central strike control can undoubtedly be considered the most potent 
sanction a confederation has in order to make its affiliated unions 




























































































distinguish between strike funds and strike rules. A confederation 
holding a significant part of the strike funds is very much in the 
position of controlling its affiliates with respect to strike 
behaviour. Although it ought to be said that it may affect smaller 
affiliates, with little or no funds of their own, more than big and 
strong affilates. One should, therefore, also look at rules 
regarding strike decisions: Does the confederation have a 
veto-right? Must it be consulted before unions can call a strike? 
Must strike decisicions be notified to the confederation? Does this 
affect all strikes or only particular ones (for instance, when two 
affilates are involved)? Or are the affiliates completely 
autonomous with regard to calling or ending a strike, instead? Of 
course, strong formal powers of a confederation in this field are 
likely to be warranted by at least some confederal share in strike 
funds affecting the actual strike pay. Where no confederal funds 
exist it is very unlikely that formal powers - would they be written 
in the confederation's constitution - do mean a great deal. This 
applies even stronger in the case of countries (Italy and France) in 
which unions generally do not have strike funds at all. Here, 
strike decisions will, effectively, be very de-centralised and 
dispersed.
Only in four countries - Austria, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands 
- confederations have a significant share in the strike funds to 
sustain their constitutional powers vis-a-vis unions. In Austria 
all strike funds are centralized in a confederal fund and the OGB's




























































































three countries the confederations hold about 25% of the strike 
funds. In Norway and Sweden, confederal control with respects to 
union strike calls is clearly present: in the Netherlands the 
confederion's power has eroded during the 1970's, i particular when 
larger unions are involved. Nonetheless, it still is important 
whether or not the confederation approves of a strike call of one of 
its affiliates, since its financial support may, in the case of the 
FNV, amount to 2/3 of the actual strike pay.
In the other countries the central peak associations do not seem to 
possess the power to support strikes with confederal funds, resp. 
to withhold their affiliates from calling a strike. The information 
on this aspect is, however, far from complete and up-to-date. 
Moreover, the non-availability of confederal strike funds does not 
preclude them from exerting pressure on their affiliates. The point 
is that they lack effective sanction power if they would not succeed 
in convincing their affiliates by other means.
In the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, West Germany and, to 
a lesser degree in Switzerland, national unions have built up strike 
funds of considerable strength and, generally, decide on strike pay 
at their national headquarters. In the case of Denmark, West 
Germany and Switzerland, however, the peak associations do not have 
a share in strike funds and have no formal or effective power to 
call, prevent or end strikes. In the UK, unions hold only very 
modest strike funds and neither the unions nor the TUC have 
effective power with respect to strike decisions. In Italy and 
France strike funds are the exception, although the FO and - 
recently - the CFDT have tried to create some "solidarity funds",




























































































their affiliated unions exert little effective strike-control.
The second-best guide as regards the powers a confederation has vis 
a vis its affiliates, is to look at the resources they have at their 
disposal. In particular, the size of its staff and its financial 
means. The number of staff working at the confederation's 
headquarter compared to the staff employed by their unions and the 
share of the total membership dues allocated to the confederation 
compared to the share of national unions should indicate the amount 
of power a confederation has acquired vis-a-vis its affiliates. Of 
course, the absolute number of confederal staff and amount of 
finances it commands is in itself important, since staff and money 
stand for services, benefits, reserves, research, training and 
education, publicity, lobbying, etc. But it is rather difficult to 
compare these assets in absolute terms. Actually, the preferable 
indicator would be to see whether one (or more) affiliate(s) have a 
larger staff and dispose of larger financial means than the 
confederation itself. This would most clearly the direction of the 
resource-dependency relationships between a peak association and its 
member associations. However, given the lack of comparative 
information on union staffs and revenues, I have restricted myself 
to a more loose and indirect level of measurement.




























































































resources I do in effect repeat the indicators used by Headey: 
staff at confederal headquarters per 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 members, and confederal 
share in union revenue from member-contributions. I have improved 
upon the data as much as I could, given the scarce data available. 
Most confederations have also considerable staffs at regional and 
local levels, but staff at headquarters seem to me the best measure 
of centralisation vis-a-vis affiliates. Confederations and 
individual unions may have other sources of revenue as well, for 
instance, revues flowing from employers, governments, public 
industries, etc., but the reallocation of member dues, usually 
collected by the affiliates, between confederations and its 
constituent unions seems to me the relevant indicator as to the 
degree of empowerment affiliates are willing, or forced, to submit 




























































































Table 16: Confederal staff resources
total union staff at confed.
staff (ratio headquarters
to members) per 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 members
Netherlands
FNV 1: 450 (1981) 20 (1981)
(NVV) (1: 480) (1971) (2 2 ) (1967)
(NKV) (1: 530) (1971) (16) (1967)
CNV 1: 517 (1971) 14 (1967)
Norway
L0 1:1350 (1976) 1 1 (1969)
Austria
0GB 1: 889 (1980) 10 (1969)
Italy
CGIL 1: 814 (1976) ca. 15 (1976)
CISL 1:1206 (1974) 7 (1974)
UIL 1: 557 (1976) 7 (1976)
France
CGT 1:7500 (1980) ca. 10 (1980) (a)
CFDT 1:6000 (1980) ca. 1 2 (1980) (a)
FO 1:9000 (1980) ca. 6 (1980)
Sweden
LO 1 : 680 (1960's) 6 (1969)
TCO ? 10 (1975)
Denmark
LO 1: 900 (1960's) 9 (1976)
FTF ? 7 (1976)
West Germany
DGB 1: 876 (1976) 4 (1969)
Switzerland




TUC 1: 3300 (1976) i (1976)
(a) includes union officials at confederion's headquarter;
the staff resources; of the CGT and CFDT are, therefore,
largely overstated.
First of all, one isi struck by the large difference in the
staff-membership ratio' s across countries. Especially, the low
ratio's for France and the United Kingdom commend attention.
Secondly, the data on staff on headquarters, whatever
improvement they need, do show three groups: powerful
confederations (the Netherlands , Norway, Sweden, Austria and
Italy, as far as the CGIL is concerned), a middle group
(consisting of France, Denmark and, perhaps, West Germany) and




























































































Table 17: Confederal financial resources
union dues as % share allocated
% of workers' to confederation
eai’nings
Austria










L0 ca. 1.3% 18.0 0/ /O (1973)
Netherlands
NVV ca. 1.5% 15.0 % (1975)
NKV ca. 1 % 16.0 % (1975)
CNV ca. 1 % 18.5 % (1974)
West Germany










CGIL 0 .7-1.0 % 8.9 % (1974)
CISL 0 .4-1.0 % 8 - 1 0 % (1974)
UIL 0 .4-1.0 % 8 - 1 0 % (1974)
France
CGT 0.5 % 8.3 % (1977)
CFDT 0.7 % 11.9 % (1977)













TUC 0.5 % 1 - 2 % (1977)
Calculated without contributions to union locals, 
the confederal shares are not including confederal strike 
funds (in the case of the French CFDT they could not be 
excluded, but this is of minor importance).
As far as the financial strength of the confederation vis-a-vis 
its affiliates is concerned, the Austrian OGB is an outstanding 
case, as has been mentioned earlier. So is the TUC at the 
other end of the scale. The SGB and, presumably, the other 





























































































Indicator: a composite score of (a) confederal power to engage or 
to intervene in collective pay bargaining, measured by 
the level at which collective pay bargaining usually 
takes place and the impact of union bargaining in the 
national economy, (b) involvement of confederal, or 
national union officials in pay bargaining, (c) the 
confederal power to call, prevent, end or prevent 
strikes, (d) to maintain a large staff, and (e) to 
collect dues from affiliates.
definitions:
(a) level at which bargaining for pay usually takes place
5 = national, economy-wide bargaining
3 = bargaining at sectoral level (or by large regional
units), restrictions to plant- and workplace bargaining 
1 = local, plant- and workplace bargaining (sectoral
bargaining, if existing, does not set strict boundaries)
This is weighted by the union density (average 1970-1980/1), 
indicating the impact of collective bargaining in the economy.
(b) involvement of confederal, or national union officials
2.5 = direct involvement of confederal officials
1.5 = pay negotiations conducted by and under control of
national union officials
0.5 = pay negotiations to considerable degree conducted 
and controlled by shop floor lay members
(c) strike control
2.5 = confederal strike funds only
1.5 = limited confederal funds 





























































































= number of staff at headquarter per 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 members
2.5 = 15 and more
1.5 = about 10
0.5 = about 3 or less
(e) confederal dues income
= percentage of dues of affiliates transferred to 
the confederation
2.5 = 25% and more
1.5 = about 10%
0.5 = less than 5%
Table 18: ORGANIZATIONAL CENTRALIZATION
(a) x density 
rate




Austria 5 0.591 2.5 2.5 2 . 0 2.5 12.5 1
Norway 5 0.604 2.5 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 11.5 2
Sweden 4 0.804 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 1 1 . 2 3
Netherlands 3 0.298 1.5 1.5 2.5 2 . 0 8 . 6 4
Denmark 3 0 . 6 8 8 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 7.6 5
West Germany 3 0.376 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.5 6 . 1 6
Italy 2 0.405 1 . 0 0.5 2 . 0 1.0 5.3 7
Switzerland 3 0.321 1 .5 1.0 0.5 0.5 4.4 8
France 1 0.225 1.0 0.5 1.5 1.0 4.2 9





























































































Organisational concentration has two dimensions: organisational 
concentration proper or the number of unions affiliated to a central 
peak associations, and membership concentration, i.e. the 
percentage of the total confederal membership represented by a given 
number of affiliates (ESTEY 1966, WINDMULLER 1981).
The number of unions is related to the capacity of a confederation 
to coordinate its affiliates. One would assume that the lesser the 
number of affiliates the greater the internal unity and the greater 
the capacity to arrive at a common policy will be. There exists a 
direct relation to internal fragmentation: the 1 sser the number of 
affiliates, the lesser the probability that they collude over 
jurisdictional conflicts. Organizational concentration is also 
directly related to size, which in turn relates to organisational 
centralisation: bigger unions will find it easier to economize 
their resources, to maintain professionalized staffs, etc. However, 
a small number of affiliates is not per se an indicator for 
organisational centralisation at the confederal level, which is our 
concern here. Larger and more powerful affiliates may find it 
easier to resist attempts by their confederations to control an 
coordinate union behaviour. It is of importance to treat this in 





























































































In Table 19 the available data on union concentration is presented. 
We see that in four countries (Austria, West Germany, Switzerland 
and the Netherlands), each confederation has between 12 and 18 
affiliates. In these countries the trade union movement is clearly 
most concentrated. Sweden comes near to this (20 to 24), Italy is 
the only other country in which the average number of affiliates per 
confederation is less than 30 unions. The confederations in Norway, 
Denmark and France have still a higher number of affiliates. The 
TUC, in this respect too, presents a clearly different picture.
More interesting, perhaps, is the general trend towards union 
concentration in the twenty years under consideration. The 
exceptions are being found in countries in which already a high 
degree of concentration had been achieved in an earlier stage, as a 
deliberate outcome of the post-war reconstitution (Austria and West 
Germany), or as a consequence of long-standing fragmentation in a 
small country like Switzerland. The other exception to the general 
trend is France, although there are recent signs that this may 
change in the near future. It is also interesting to see that union 
concentration in Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark is a phenomenon 
of the 1970's, whereas in Sweden the big changes took place in the 
1960's. In the UK union concentration (through mergers) took off 
after 1964, in Norway the process is not confined to a particular 
period and, at any rate, of a very gradual nature.
It would be interesting to know whether this trend is only a 
post-war trend, whether it also occurred among the so-called 
"independent" unions and the smaller confederations, or - inversely 
- whether the concentration process in the main peak associations 




























































































particularly among white collar sections of the work-force.
Table 19: number of affiliated unions
1958 1968 1980
Austria
0GB 16 16 15 (since 1978)
West Germany
DGB 16 16 17 (since 1978)
Netherlands
FNV





NKV 23 2 1 (9) (1975)
CNV 24 24 15 (since 1981)
Norway
L0 43 38 33 (1978)
Switzerland
SGB 15 15 15 (1980)
CNG 10 13 13 (1976)
VSA 10 1 2 12 (1980)
Sweden
LO 43 27 24 (1981)
TCO 37 ? 20 (1981)
Denmark
LO 69 57 37 (1981)
FTF 38 9 35 (1981)
Italy
CGIL ? 38 23 (1983)
CISL ? 41 32 (1983)
UIL ? 32 28 (1983)
France
CGT ? 42 38 (1980)
CFDT ? 29 24 (1980)
FO ? 32 30 (1980)
United Kingdom
TUC 186 155 109 (1979)
Organisational concentration entails membership concentration. The 
average size of the affiliated unions has increased, far more than 
is accounted for by the growth of union membership in the countries 
considered (except for the OGB, DGB, SGB and CNG). This development 
was strongest in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, and - only 
recently - in Italy.




























































































concentration. The percentage of members represented by the first 
10 affiliated unions gives a rough impression of the degree of 
membership concentration. From this data one can get also a first 
impression of the inequality between the affiliates in terms of 
size. The equality of affiliates is relevant in so far that a large 
difference in size between the affiliates, and in particular a 
predominant position of one (or two) affiliates, is often hampering 
the development of a strong confederal authority vis-a-vis its 
affiliates in general. W.Galenson, for instance, has suggested that 
the difference in centralisation between the Norwegian and Danish LO 
may be explained by the dominance of one large unions (on its own 
accounting for over one-third of the LO-membership) in the Danish 
LO, whereas the Norwegian LO was composed of a large number of 
relatively equal and small unions (GALSNSON 1968). Other examples 
of this can be found in the DGB (the metalworkers' union), the Dutch 
NVV (especially since the amalgamation of a number of industrial 
unions in a conglomerate union in 1972). The table on membership 
concentration is followed by one in which some picture of the degree 
of inequality between affiliates can be drawn (Table 21). From 
grouped data I have computed the coefficients of variation in union 
size for each confederation. The smallest differences are found in 
the Austrian 0GB and the Norwegian LO. Interestingly, for very 
different reasons, a small but relatively equal number of affiliates 
belonging to the 0GB but a large and relatively number of affiliates 
belonging to the LO. So, we are concerned with two dimensions: 
number of affiliates and equality of size in terms of members and, 
presumably, power resources. The overall indicator of




























































































dimensions. The lower the value (number of affiliates x equality of 
affiliates), the higher the degree of unions concentration. The 
values are presented in Table 22, which shows clearly three groups 
of countries: Austria, Switzerland, West Germany and the 
Netherlands with a highly concentrated union movement, an 
intermediate group to which Norway, Sweden and Italy belong, and, 
finally, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom, countries in which 





























































































Table 20: Membership Concentration
Percentage of confederal membership organized in largest, five largest 
and ten largest affiliated unions, 1958, 1968 and 1980.
1958 1968 1980
(1 ) (1-5) (1 -1 0 ) (1 ) (1-5) (1 -1 0 ) (1 ) (1-5) (1 -1 0 )
Switzerland
SGB 29.8 81.0 96.6a 20.9 79.8 28.8 81.5 96.7 ( ’80)
CNG 32.2 88.9 1 0 0.0a - - - 32.2 84.6 98.3 ( '76)
VSA 59.1 95.0 1 0 0.0a 53.2 93.0 99.3b 51.8 94.7 99.3 ( '80)
Netherlands
FNV 26.7 80.7 97.0 ( '82)
NVV 19.1 64.2 90.1 19.8 70.2 92.6 26.8 90.1 97.8 ( ’78)
NKV 14.7 55.9 79.6 19.5 62.0 83.6 37.8 91.1 1 0 0 . 0 ( ’78)
CNV
Austria
18.3 69.2 89.4 21.7 73.6 91.8 27.3 75.3 97.0 ( '82)
0GB 18.3 61.2 89.6 18.5 65.3 90.2 20.4 70.0 91.6 ( '80)
West Germany
DGB 28.5 67.9 83.6 31.9 69.3 90.0 33.0 68.5 89.8 ( ’81)
Sweden
L0 18.0 46.5 64.8 2 0 . 1 55.4 70.4 25.2 70.3 87.7 ( ’81)
TCO
Denmark
25.4 56.7 67.6 — — — 28.0 70.8 92.8 ( '81)
LO 34.3 63.6 83.6 27.7 67.7 80.6c 26.9 72.3 87.1 ( '80)
FTF - - - 2 0 . 1 51.7 62.4c 2 1 . 1 54.7 69.2 ( '80)
Italy 
CGIL (d) 27.9 69.7 17.8 61.8 83.2 17.1 63.5 85.2 ( '78)
CISL (d) 18.3 48.8 - 1 2 . 8 45.8 - 17.0 54.1 70.0 ( ’78)
UIL - - - - - - - - -
Norway
LO 1 2 . 0 46.0 70.0 13.7 47.6 69.9 18.5 54.9 74.7 ( '78)
United Kingdom
TUC 15.2 47.8 60.9 16.3 44.0 61.2 14.4 43.9 59.7 ( '81)
(a) = 1960; (b) = 1965; (c) = 1973; (d) = calculated without pensioners; 




























































































Table 21: Inequality of affiliates
year total largest average coeff.
deral affiliate size of of var.
membership affil.
(a) (a) (a) (b)
Austria
OGB 1980 1.661.000 339.000 1 1 1 . 0 0 0 0.84
Norway
L0 1978 720.000 132.000 34.500 0.93
Switzerland
SGB 1980(c) 429.000 124.000 29.000 1.17
CNG 1976 107.000 34.000 8 . 0 0 0 1.14
VSA 1980 145.000 75.000 1 2 . 0 0 0 1.67
West-Germany
DGB 1981 7.958.000 2.626.000 468.000 1.25
Netherlands
FNV 1982 1.066.000 274.000 57.000 1.30
CNV 1982 342.000 93.500 23.000 1.06
Italy
CGIL 1978(c) 3.545.000 606.000 148.000 1 . 1 2
CISL 1978(c) 2.411.000 410.000 63.000 1.31
UIL 1978(c) 1.066.000 - 38.000 -
Sweden
L0 1981 2.141.000 539.500 89.000 1.38
TOO 1981 1.062.000 297.000 53.000 1.30
Denmark
LO 1980 1.278.000 344.000 34.500 1.91




1981 1 1 .00 0 . 0 0 0 1.584.000 108.000 2.09
France
CGT 1980 1.400.000 320.000 37.000 -
CFDT 1980 740.000 - 24.000 -
FO 1980 720.000 - 31.000 —
notes: (a) rounded off figures
(b) calculated from grouped data (4 categories)



























































































Table 22: composite indicator of ORGANISATIONAL CONCENTRATION 
= number of affiliates x inequality of affiliates 



















































1 . 1 2 25.8
1.31 41.9
“ —




































































































notes: (a) In order to calculate the averages per country the 
relative share in membership of each confederation 
has taken into account. For example, in Switzerland: 
SGB : CNG : VSA = 0.6 : 0.2 : 0.2 = 1 
Thus: 0.6x17.6 + 0.2x14.8 + 0.2x20.0 = 17.5
(b) I have assumed the inequality of UIL-affiliates to lie 
somewhere between the value for the CGIL and CISL
























































































































































































As announced in the introduction, this paper limits itself to the 
discussion and construction of indicators, as well as to the 
presentation of comparative data. As such, this still needs further 
improvement, in particular with respect to the indicators and data 
on union centralisation proper. As a next step one needs to study 
the main union organisations (affiliates) and their relationships 
with the confederations in order to arrive at a more complete 
picture. Furthermore, it seems necessary to study these phenomena 
in a dynamic way and, more than the presented data allow us to do, 
to account for the variance Over time.
Intended as a contribution to the development of a comparative 
data-base on union confederations, and improving, I hope, the data
referred to in the literature on uni n centralisation and
neo-corporatism, I have deliberately not embarked upon the
discussion about causal links. Actually , what one really wants to
know is, how certain organisational properties of national union 
movements came into existence in the first place, how they have been 
maintained or, in some cases, changed, how they relate to the 
organizational structures of employers' associations, governmental 
bureaucracy, industrial relations and legal interventions. Next, a 
set of questions about how such organisational properties relate to 




























































































differentials, strike behaviour, incomes policies, etc.). This will 
be the subject of follow-up studies, in particular with regard to 
union employment policies. For a start, it seemed necessary to give 
a purely descriptive picture of the national union movements in 
Western Europe. A reassumption of the devolopment, during, the past 
two decades or so, of the central peak federations of trade unions, 
both in terms of centralisation and of unity & monopoly, can be 
found in the graph on the next page.
Finally, there remains the troublesome question of the combination 
of the three multiple indicators proposed. Which theoretically 
meaningful and empirical valid relations exist between confederal 
centralisation, organisational concentration and representational 
monopoly and unity? As can be seen from the table that follows, 
quite a few incongruences remain. High confederal centralisation 
relates definitely to high organisational concentration, but the 
reverse is not always true (Switzerland, West Germany). The 
question arises, whether organisational concentration is a 
functional alternative for centralisation at confederal level, 
allowing some major union affiliate to coordinate, without the use 
of central authority, the movement as a whole? Clearly, 
centralisation and representational monopoly and unity depart in 
many cases. Both in the relatively unified Norwegian movement, but 
with a low degree of representational monopoly, as in the pluriform 
Dutch confederations, we find at the same time very centralised 
centres. So, a highly centralized and concentrated confederation 
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would, therefore, be misled if one would infer too much with respect 
to the capacities of control and coordination existing in a national 
union movement by only looking at these confederations, as 
especially competition by outside union-centres seems a strong force 
to upset any centrally agreed or commonly established policy. The 
United Kingdom, finally, presents a rather clamorous inverse case, 
that is to say, a seemingly highly monopolized and representational 
confederation may lack all the organisational resources and the 
degree of concentration necessarry for any control over its 
constituent parts.
Table 23: comparision of three rankorders
centralisation concentration monopoly & unity
Austria H (1) H (1) H (1 )
Sweden H (3) M (6 ) H (3)
Norway H (2) M (5) M (3)
West-Germany L (6 ) H (3) H (2 )
Netherlands M (4) H (4) L (8 )
Denmark M (5) L (8 ) M (5)
Switzerland L (8 ) H (2) L (9)
Italy L (7) M (7) M (7)
United Kingdom L(1 0 ) L( 10) M (4)
France L (9) L (9) L(10)
rho (centralisation : concentration) = 0.56 (sign, at 0.05 level)
rho (centralisation : unity & monopoly) = 0.48 (sign. at 0 . 1  level
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